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EMBEDDING IRONY
Embedding Irony  
and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction 
This paper argues that we need to re-think the semantics/pragmatics distinction in the light of  new 
evidence from embedding of  irony. This raises a new version of  the old problem of  ‘embedded implicatures’. 
I argue that embedded irony isn’t fully explained by solutions proposed for other embedded implicatures. 
I first consider two strategies: weak pragmatics and strong pragmatics. These explain embedded irony as truth-
conditional content. However, by trying to shoehorn irony into said-content, they raise problems of  their 
own. I conclude by considering how a modified Gricean model can explain that irony embeds qua 
implicature. This leads us to prefer a local implicature model. 
Keywords: embedded irony, embedding, truth-conditional compositionality, embedded implicatures, 
local implicatures, semantics/pragmatics distinction.  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Embedding Irony  
and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction 
This paper argues that we need to re-think the semantics/pragmatics distinction in the light of  new 
evidence from embedding of  irony. This raises a new version of  the old problem of  ‘embedded implicatures’. 
I argue that embedded irony isn’t fully explained by solutions proposed for other embedded implicatures. 
I first consider two strategies: weak pragmatics and strong pragmatics. These explain embedded irony as truth-
conditional content. However, by trying to shoehorn irony into said-content, they raise problems of  their 
own. I conclude by considering how a modified Gricean model can explain that irony embeds qua 
implicature. This leads us to prefer a local implicature model. 
1	 The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction 
Where does semantics end and pragmatics begin? The traditional answer has been that pragmatics 
starts where semantics finishes. To a first approximation, this division of  labour reflects Grice’s 
(1989) division of  speaker-meaning into two parts: what is said and what is implicated. Saying comes 
before implicating, and functions as a central part of  the supporting evidence for working out what 
else, or what more, the speaker may have implicated in uttering a sentence S. Most of  the debates 
on the semantics/pragmatics distinction have predominantly focused on the epistemological 
question of  how meaning is derived—how it is that hearers try to work out what it is that the 
speaker meant.  This is concerned with what kind of  information and processes hearers use as 1
evidence to form a hypothesis about what the speaker has said and/or implicated in uttering S.  
Accordingly, said-content is determined compositionally—by composing the semantic meanings or 
contents of  individual words (relative to context), together with their mode of  composition via the 
syntactic structure of  the sentence. Implicated-content is inferred contextually by reasoning about why 
the speaker has said what she said in a given context. These two ways of  extracting meaning do not 
mix: saying is bottom-up driven by rules of  grammar; implicating is top-down driven by common-
sense reasoning. 
 Grice distinguishes the epistemological question from the metaphysical question of  meaning determination. The 1
metaphysical determination concerns how meaning supervenes on the speaker’s communicative intentions. In other words, 
meaning comes from the mental states of  the speaker and these mental states involve higher-order type intentions to get 
something across while being perceived by the hearer as trying to get something across. The epistemological determination 
is concerned with how hearers recognise the speaker’s communicative intention and work out what it is that they are trying 
to communicate. Though the metaphysical and epistemological questions are separate, they constrain one another. Speakers 
want (and expect) to be understood, and hearers seek (and expect) to understand. So, in forming communicative intentions 
the speaker relies on the hearer’s ability to grasp those intentions. Vice-versa, in interpreting an utterance, the hearer relies 
in turn on the speaker’s capacity to exploit this ability. For details about the methodological flaws that may arise from 
conflating this distinction, see Bach (2005a), Neale (2005), among others. 
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This way of  motivating the semantics/pragmatics distinction has been fraught with heated 
disputes because it doesn’t perfectly align with the said/implicated distinction.  This is because we 2
often leave things un-said in what we say. So some pragmatics is needed to determine what was said, 
either to fill in what is missing, or fill out what is not contextually specific. This much is undisputed.  
What is disputed is how much contextual supplementation is needed, and what kind of  pragmatic 
processes should be allowed to provide it. Some propose weak pragmatics; others strong pragmatics. 
Proponents of  weak pragmatics require that the pragmatic supplementation be constrained by 
semantic rules (e.g. saturation of  indexicals, demonstratives, and other context-sensitive expressions, 
disambiguation).  This results in ‘weak’ pragmatic effects which feed directly into compositionality—3
thus retaining a strong and robust semantic compositionality. Proponents of  strong pragmatics are more 
liberal, allowing linguistically unconstrained pragmatic processes to intrude into what is said.  This 4
sometimes serves to fill the gap between sentence meaning and what we say, and other times it may 
require recruiting certain types of  implicatures in order to fill in the gap between what we say and 
what we mean, when what we mean goes well beyond what the words themselves mean. This 
requires a ‘free’ pragmatic inference—‘free’ in the sense of  a top-down reasoning unconstrained by 
linguistic rules. This reasoning is similar to calculating implicatures, except that it applies locally to 
individual words and phrases. This results in ‘strong’ pragmatic effects which feed directly into 
compositionality—though this calls for a weaker compositionality known as pragmatic compositionality. 
Despite the differences in details, both camps are equally motivated by a desire to preserve 
compositionality—more specifically, truth-conditional compositionality which holds that both inputs and 
outputs of  compositional processes are truth-conditional contents. One way to secure this is to ban 
implicatures from intruding into compositionality. This thesis has taken various guises —here I shall 5
call it truth-conditional embedding (henceforth TC-Embedding):  
TC-Embedding:	 If  S is embedded in a compound sentence, like conditionals, disjunctions, 
	 	 belief-reports, etc., then what S contributes to the compound cannot be an 	
	 	 implicature, but only a truth-conditional content. 
TC-Embedding is associated with a commonly held assumption that logical operators work truth-
functionally, by mapping S’s truth-conditions onto the truth-conditions of  the whole compound.  6
This means that S embedded under an operator is only performed in a propositional act—an act of  
uttering a sentence with a propositional (true/false assessable) content such that the utterance can 
 I’ll use the said/implicated distinction as a proxy for the semantics/pragmatics distinction, though an imperfect one. As 2
we’ll see, pragmatics intrudes into semantics in order to fill the gap between the sentence meaning and what the speaker 
means to say. Nevertheless, the kind of  pragmatics that contrasts sharply with semantics concerns paradigmatic 
conversational implicatures. For simplicity, I leave aside controversial questions of  whether conventional implicatures exist 
(for a denial, see Bach 1994), or whether conversational implicatures exist (for a denial, see Gauker 2001, Lepore & Stone 
2014), or whether or not we can have a semantics for a language (for a denial, see Travis 2000; Pietroski forth).
 Stanley (2000), Stanley & Szabó (2000), King & Stanley (2005), Cappelan & Lepore (2005), Borg (2004), among others.3
 Recanati (2004), Carston (2002), Bezuidenhout (2002), among others.4
 This thesis usually goes by the name of  Scope Principle, cf. Recanati (1989); see also Wilson (1975), Carston (1991), Green 5
(1998), O’Rourke (2003), Camp (2012).
 For Grice, the semantics of  connectives is given entirely by their standard truth-functional interpretation, which is non-6
cancellable content.
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be judged true or false. This content may be identical with or otherwise closely correspond to that 
of  the sentence’s literal meaning. Nevertheless, this is a content stripped of  its mode of  delivery—say, 
the illocutionary act under which S is performed and/or any implicature(s) that S may otherwise 
carry. Thus, what is common between S uttered as a self-standing act and S embedded under a 
compound sentence is only their truth-conditional content. 
TC-Embedding thus offers a principled way of  separating implicatures from other kinds of  
pragmatic processes that intrude into what is said. In particular, it helps us make sense of  so-called 
‘embedded implicatures’. If  a pragmatic meaning conveyed by uttering S is found to embed in a 
compound utterance—e.g. conditional, disjunction, belief-report—then it’s reasonable to think that 
it’s not an implicature but rather a pragmatic component of  said-content.  
Cohen (1971) first introduced this argument in support of  his anti-Gricean, semantic reanalysis 
of  alleged implicatures that are generated by and subsequently embedded in sub-sentential clauses. 
His solution is to treat the alleged implicature of  constituent embedded sentences as some form of  
truth-conditional content so that it can serve as input into the computation of  the truth-conditions 
of  compound utterances. This argument has been extended to many putative implicatures, most of  
which are of  a generalized variety (e.g. ‘and’, ‘a’)—i.e. which arise in most normal contexts unless 
the speaker does something to block them.  Metaphor has also been shown to embed, thus 7
supporting a truth-conditional account of  metaphor.  Similarly, for other alleged implicatures 8
involved in hyperbole, loose use, metonymy (Camp 2012). The most disputed cases are scalar 
implicatures. For example, whereas an assertion of  ‘Some goats are happy’ might implicate that not 
all are, it is widely held that an assertion of  ‘Mary believes that some goats are happy’ typically imputes 
to Mary the belief  that some but not all goats are. However, there is no consensus about the nature of  
this strengthened meaning of  ‘some’. Some argue that it is an implicature carried by the whole 
belief-report.  Others argue that it is a truth-conditional meaning that is locally assigned to that-9
clause such that it undergoes compositionality and feeds into what is said.  However, Cohen’s 10
argument has been resisted in a number of  cases—e.g. generalized implicatures (Walker 1975, 
Green 1998), conventional implicatures (Barker 2003), relevance-implicatures (Simons 2010), even 
conversational implicatures (García-Carpintero 2001)—where it has been contended that 
implicatures can embed as implicatures. This means that what is said with compound utterances 
may depend on something more than just the truth-conditions of  their constituent sentences. 
Regardless of  one’s theoretical position, embedded implicatures underscore interesting ways in 
which semantics and pragmatics are intimately interleaved. This is part of  a larger phenomenon, 
including so-called ‘multiplicatures’—implicatures generated from discourse segments containing 
several sentences (Geurts 2009), and also figurative compounds—e.g. where a metaphor is used for 
ironic purposes.  These cases raise serious challenges for Grice, calling into question his notion of  11
 Levinson (2000), Recanati (1989, 2003, 2004), Carston (1991, 2002, 2004).7
 Stern 2000, Carston 2002, Popa 2009, 2010a, b, Camp 2012, Wearing 2013.8
 Sauerland 2004; Rooij and Schultz 2004; Russell 2006; Geurts 2009, among others.9
 Two strategies have been used to implement this idea. One involves weak pragmatics constrained by lexicon or syntax, the 10
result of  which is factored in locally in the course of  determining truth-conditions (Chierchia et al. 2012, and previous 
developments referenced therein). The other involves strong pragmatics in the form of  a free pragmatic inference, the result 
of  which is fed compositionally into what is said (Carston 1998; Breheny & Katsos 2005; Noveck & Sperber 2007).
 Bezuidenhout 2001, Camp 2006, 2012, Popa 2009, 2010a, b, Popa-Wyatt 2017.11
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implicature,  or calling for amendments by replacing Grice’s model with a more cognitively 12
oriented model (Bezuidenhout 2015). 
My aim here is to add a further challenge to the mix. This involves a neglected type of  
embedded implicature involving irony. I argue that this raises problems we need to take seriously in 
theorising about the semantics/pragmatics distinction. First, is irony a pragmatic or a semantic 
phenomenon? Answering this question must take into account the idea that irony embeds. This 
raises a problem for the Gricean-implicature view of  irony (§2), despite attempts to deny the 
problem (§3). A non-implicature strategy, therefore, might seem a promising solution (§4-5). 
Nevertheless, I argue that this style of  solution robs us of  important resources to explain what’s 
characteristic of  irony, namely a particular mode of  delivering involving a ridiculing portrayal of  
someone’s cognitive states. The question remains whether the Gricean model has resources to 
accommodate the challenge (§6). I argue that it does, though this may require re-thinking the 
semantics/pragmatics distinction. 
2	  The Problem of  Embedding Irony  
Let’s begin with irony. When used in self-standing acts, irony involves engaging in a pretence act 
that is a ridiculing portrayal of  a cognitive state. Imagine I say something ridiculous and you reply: 
(1)	 That was a brilliant idea! 
Clearly, you are not serious. Rather, you pretend to be someone who thinks my idea was great only 
to ridicule it, thus communicating that the opposite holds—that my idea was idiotic.  
This view was promoted by Grice (1975/89: 34; 53-4; 120) under his implicature model—
henceforth GRICE. Accordingly, an ironic speaker says or makes as if  to say something untrue, 
pretending to perform an illocutionary act, and thereby conversationally implicates the opposite. Grice 
also notes that expressing a derogatory attitude is critical to what one is doing with irony. Though 
he doesn’t say much about the nature and role of  this attitude,  the basics of  his model hold pretty 13
well. We can summarise this as below—where P is what is said literally in uttering S, and <Invert-
P> denotes the state of  affairs that is the opposite condition of  the state of  affairs expressed by P: 
Irony: 	 (i) a ridiculing attitude towards P (for a contextually given P). 
            	 	 (ii) a belief  that <Invert-P > is the case. 
This schematic treatment only focuses on declarative sentences, leaving out cases of  ironic 
questions, orders, etc. Since I’m not concerned with giving a theory of  self-standing irony, it will do.  
 Gauker 2001, Lepore & Stone 2014.12
 For developments of  attitude-theories, see pretence theories (Currie 2006, Recanati 2004) and echoic theories (Wilson 13
2006). For a hybrid view, see Popa-Wyatt (2014).
!6
EMBEDDING IRONY
How shall we think of  the commitments (i) and (ii)—of  Irony? First, let’s assume with Grice 
that (ii) is conversational implicature.  Second, it seems reasonable to think that by expressing a 14
disparaging attitude towards P, I further indicate that I believe something like <Invert-P>. This 
means that (i) and (ii) are equally important to what we do with irony, so it might seem natural to 
assume that both are conversationally implicated.  This makes sense: if  the speaker engages in a 15
ridiculing portrayal of  someone’s cognitive states, the hearer can infer that the speaker has a 
mocking attitude towards that person,  and therefore she believes an inverted-content.  16
GRICE has recently come under attack on account that irony embeds under various complex 
sentences (Levinson 2000, Camp 2012). Camp (2012: 600) explains that when irony embeds it 
contributes ‘an inverted meaning to the compositional determination of  a propositional content 
which is itself  put forward with genuine force’. To illustrate, let’s take a variation of  (1). Imagine I 
say again something ridiculous, and this time you warn me: 
(2)	 If  you come up with another brilliant idea like that, you’re fired.  
Clearly, what you mean is that you’ll fire me if  I come up with another idiotic idea. You utter 
something ironically in the antecedent, which gives rise to the inference that my earlier idea was 
bad, and this inference is then incorporated into the overall point you make with the conditional.  
Nevertheless, in uttering (2) the speaker is not ironic in the same way she is in uttering (1). There 
need be no commitment to the attitude and belief  under Irony (i)-(ii). Why? Because the speaker’s 
purpose in (2) is not to be ironic: she merely uses irony to achieve other goals—e.g. to show how 
characteristic ironic commitments in the antecedent entail certain commitments in the consequent. 
For example, her belief  that the addressee is probably going to produce another idiotic idea licenses 
her,  if  they do, to fire them. Yet understanding the conditional does not require that the speaker 
undertake ironic commitments. It suffices if  she displays characteristic ironic commitments in the 
antecedent so that the hearer can draw out their consequences. Thus, irony is conditionalized—i.e. 
is confined at the level of  the antecedent—while the whole conditional remains non-ironic.  
Irony embeds under other operators as well.  Consider its embedding under a belief/thought 17
report. Take the following report by Tan: 
(3)	 Max believes/thinks that George is a real genius. 
There are at least three readings of  (3). Reading-1 is one in which the reporter, Tan, ridicules 
someone who would believe that Max believes George is a genius. To make this reading clear, Tan 
 From now on, I’ll use ‘implicature’ as a shorthand for conversational implicature, unless otherwise specified.14
 By saying that the attitude is implicature I don’t mean that it is calculable, but merely that it is implicitly expressed as a 15
way of  meaning something more than what the words themselves mean. 
 The ridicule typically expressed with irony can also be expressed towards oneself: e.g. after locking myself  out and 16
realising I left the house keys inside, I say to myself  ‘Wonderful!’.
 Given space limitations, I cannot discuss in details further possible embeddings—e.g. under disjunction, quantifiers, 17
epistemic modals, or other discourse connectives such as ‘since’, ‘because’. It’s worth noting that given syntactic constraints, 
we should expect the embedded sentences to be typically indicative sentences. 
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might stress in a mock tone the word ‘believes’, or emphasise it with an intensifier by saying ‘Max so 
believes that George is a genius’. Irony doesn’t embed here; instead it takes wide-scope over Max’s 
believing that George is a genius (literally), so the resulting inverted-content is: Max does not believe 
George is a real genius. 
There are two other readings for (3), both in which irony embeds, taking a narrow-scope. For 
Reading-2, suppose Max frequently makes claims in the ironic mode, in particular with derision 
about George’s intellectual capacities. This is the mode in which Max thinks ironically and delivers 
ironic speech. Thus, in uttering (3) Tan is reporting that Max is ridiculing anyone who might think 
George is a genius. To make this reading clear, Tan might stress in a mock tone the words ‘a real 
genius’ to emphasise that those are Max’s words. Irony takes here narrow-scope over ‘a real genius’, so 
the resulting inverted-content is contained as part of  that-clause: Max believes that George is the 
opposite of  a real genius. What about the attitude? Since Max is the one thinking in ironic mode, then 
it’s reasonable to think that both attitude and inverted-content are commitments that fall under his 
viewpoint. Let’s call this reading large narrow-scope.  
It should be obvious that on this reading, Tan doesn’t have to have the ironic commitments 
characteristic of  someone who is ironic about George. She is merely reporting that Max has them. 
For example, the following is a natural continuation of  the conversation: 
(4)	 Ted: Max is really underwhelmed by George. 
Tan: Yeah. He thinks he’s a real genius. Little does he know: George is a real genius.  
Tan’s last utterance is non-ironic: she believes that George is indeed cognitively gifted, even though 
she is reporting that Max thinks the opposite. So, on this reading, neither the attitude nor the 
inverted-content projects to become a commitment that Tan undertakes with the whole utterance. 
Irony doesn’t scope out here: instead it is ascribed to Max’s thought. The continuation makes 
explicit that the ironic commitments are Max’s and not Tan’s.  
Reading-3 is likewise narrow-scope, but in this case Max is known to be an utterly un-ironic guy. 
He never says or thinks anything in the ironic mode. Suppose, however, that we have evidence that 
Max thinks that George is extremely dim. Then, in uttering (3) Tan is not reporting that Max is 
ironic, but is merely phrasing ironically Max’s belief  that George is an idiot. Nevertheless, Tan need 
not incur the ironic commitments herself. This is because she introduces an ironic mode to 
characterise Max’s non-ironic belief, not her own beliefs. Crucially, since Max lacks an ironic mode, 
this means that he cannot be attributed an ironic attitude through the report. Let’s call this reading 
small narrow-scope in the sense that only inverted-content is contained in that-clause, not the attitude.  
Note that the difference between Reading-2 and Reading-3 is not to do with scope. It’s to do 
instead with the relation between the content of  that-clause as produced by the reporter (Tan) and 
the content believed by the reportee (Max). On Reading-2, the irony expressed with that-clause 
matches Max’s ironic viewpoint. On Reading-3, the irony expressed with that-clause only partially 
matches Max’s viewpoint, by ironically rephrasing his non-ironic belief.  
What’s interesting about these narrow-scope readings is that they require us to countenance the 
idea of  an ironic mode to capture the mode of  thinking, or doing something ironically. This typically 
amounts to dramatising something, in a ridiculing way, thereby expressing a variety of  attitudes 
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ranging from mockery, poking fun, teasing, to criticising and disparaging, and further conveying 
some inverted-content. This is what Max is reported as doing on Reading-2.  However, on 18
Reading-3, the ironic mode is merely used to specify a non-ironic content.  
We should therefore think of  irony not as a mere vehicle for conveying propositional content—
that one has a ridiculing attitude and believes an inverted-content—but as a mode of  thinking and doing 
things that involves undertaking a ridiculing stance. This means that we cannot separate the content 
from the mode of  delivery. This aligns with the idea that irony is a matter of  doing—doing 
something with words—a mode of  conducting action involving a known form of  play, pretence or 
caricature, and thus echoing certain views that are found wanting with the aim of  ridiculing them.  19
We can represent this thus: 
Ironic Act:	 Uttering S under a ridiculing mode is pretending to believe/assert S and/or 
	 	 echoing someone else’s assertion or thought, thus expressing (given manifest 
	 	 absurdity) commitments (i) and (ii)—of  Irony. 
Should we call this an illocutionary act? I don’t see why not. After all, it’s a move in a 
conversational game. It’s doing something with a sentence: it’s pretending to do one thing to 
achieve something else. This is compatible with GRICE—i.e. having the commitments (i)-(ii) of  
Irony undertaken as implicature. 
With this extension on board, how are we to explain the embedding patterns above? We saw 
that the embedded sentences (the antecedent in (2); that-clause in (3)) use irony, but are not self-
standing ironic utterances. How does the ironic meaning (including attitude and inverted-content) 
appear in the embedded sentence? Is it something we say or something we implicate? Given the said/
implicated distinction, this is the choice we are offered. But, if  we assume with GRICE that irony is 
implicated, this requires explaining how implicatures of  sentence-parts can enter compositionally 
into what is said (asked, ordered, etc.) with the whole compound. This is problematic, since TC-
Embedding bans implicatures from entering compositional processes. How are we then to solve this 
problem? One way out would be to simply deny the problem—that embedding doesn’t really occur. 
This is a possible Gricean rejoinder. 
3	  Gricean Rejoinder: No Embedding 
Consider again the conditional in (2) repeated below:  
(2)	 If  you come up with another brilliant idea like that, you’re fired. 
 This requires the idea of  a belief  with ironic content. But this is contrast with the orthodox idea that beliefs are 18
propositional attitudes, whereby propositional attitudes are truth/false-assessable contents that are, essentially, propositions. 
See Barker (2017) taking up this issue. For an analysis of  belief-reports containing irony, see Barker & Popa-Wyatt (2015).
 This is consistent with irony being uttered on a deadpan.19
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According to the Gricean, (2) is a typical case of  implicature where what the speaker means doesn’t 
‘fit’ the meaning of  the sentence uttered. She says she will fire the addressee if  they come up with 
another brilliant idea, but this doesn’t make much sense. So, the interpreter needs to look for a 
hypothesis on which the conditional makes sense. This could be that the addressee will be fired if  
they produce another idiotic idea. On this reading, the whole conditional carries an implicature 
containing irony as part of  it. This means that since a speaker is committed to the implicatures of  
their utterance, that the whole conditional becomes ironic. 
This wide-scope hypothesis is however untenable. First, if  the whole conditional is ironic, then 
this means that the speaker must be giving a ridiculing portrayal of  an absurd belief  whose content 
is the conditional she utters taken literally. But what’s the absurdity of  that conditional on a literal 
reading? Is it that employers fire their employees if  they come up with brilliant ideas? Secondly, it’s 
not very clear what the inverted-content is meant to be. Is it that the speaker won’t fire the 
addressee if  they come with idiotic ideas? Clearly, the setting is not for a wide-scope reading. Third, 
the wide-scope reading is not consistent with this follow-up by Tan: 
(5)	 Here she comes again: shining on us another brilliant idea. Can’t wait the next gem! 
Tan’s follow-up, together with the conditional in (2), looks like modus ponens. Tan is drawing the 
implications from that conditional. But this fits with a narrow-scope reading in which only the 
antecedent is ironic, and not the whole conditional. 
 Another hypothesis the Gricean might adopt is that what’s ironic in a conditional like (2) is 
instead the implication carried by a normal supposition made with the antecedent. Namely, that the 
addressee producing another brilliant idea is a live epistemic possibility. The irony is that this is 
clearly the opposite of  a live possibility. This hypothesis has some plausibility. It may be that some 
conditionals are produced with this kind of  irony. But this idea does not fit with the present case, 
since it doesn’t explain the relation between the conditional in (2) and Tan’s follow-up in (5), which 
depends on the antecedent being ironic.  
The key idea is that the conditional seems to express an implication from the correctness of  the 
ironic antecedent to the correctness of  the literal consequent. This means that only the antecedent 
is ironic, while the whole conditional remains non-ironic. It looks like irony can embed after all.  
Now if  we want to maintain GRICE that irony is an implicature, then the conversational 
implicatures—Irony (i)–(ii)—that it carries in a self-standing act, would also have to be present as 
commitments of  the compound utterance in which irony embeds. But they are not: in uttering a 
conditional like (2) the speaker lacks such commitments. Nevertheless, irony embeds in some form. 
For proponents of  TC-Embedding that can only mean one thing. Irony must be a truth-conditional 
operation. I turn now to two strategies for implementing this truth-conditional operation.  
4	  Irony embeds as ‘weak’ pragmatic effect  
One proposal is that irony is a component of  propositional (truth-conditional) content. Semanticists 
who advocate weak pragmatics explain the pragmatic supplementation needed to determine truth-
!10
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conditions by virtue of  a linguistic rule.  Camp (2012: 591; 599) has first applied this idea to irony. 20
She postulates a covert ‘sarcasm-operator’ (henceforth Sarc) within the logical form (LF) that is not 
reflected in the word sequence, but is realised at the surface level by an ironic or sarcastic 
intonation. The idea is that para-linguistic signals—to which we may add facial expression, gesture, 
eye-rolling, etcetera—are a key part of  the evidence that interpreters use to identify speaker 
meaning. Camp says that Sarc works semantically by taking as input the literal meaning of  a word 
or phrase, and returning an inverted-content which then enters compositionally into what is said. 
She then applies this rule to lexical irony or sarcasm which targets only a word or phrase while the 
rest of  the utterance is sincere: 
(6)	 Your fine friend is here. 
The intonation is built into a semantic rule that inverts the semantic (literal) content of  the word or 
phrase used ironically, and which we can capture thus:  
Sarc1:	 When prefixed to a (literal) expression ϕ, Sarc maps the meaning of  ϕ onto a set of  
	 relevant alternatives or contraries relative to a context c—denoted with [Invert-ϕ]	
	 —such that the proposition <Sarc[ϕ] (c)> is either true or false.  
  
Despite the elegance of  this rule, some further pragmatic processes are still required in order to 
determine how the semantic rule is to be applied. First, to determine the scope of  the Sarc-operator, 
then to scan for a set of  inverted meanings relative to c, and finally to determine the most salient of  
these contrary candidates.  The upshot is that the resulting inverted-content feeds directly into 21
what is said, or other primary illocutionary acts—e.g. the content of  what is asked or requested.  
This particular way of  subsuming pragmatics into a semantic rule, though familiar from other 
cases, including metaphor (Stern 2000), is not trivially solved in irony. Stern is sceptical about the 
prospects for a semantic rule for irony, since it’s hard to determine semantically whether in a given 
context the relevant contrary is a ‘contradictory or a polar opposite or some contrary midway on 
the continuum from the mere contradictory to the polar opposite’ (2000: 236). 
Even assuming that so much pragmatics can be built into a semantic rule, Sarc-analysis has quite 
limited coverage. Camp restricts the Sarc-analysis to lexical sarcasm, allowing that irony has a multi-
faceted behaviour, at times contributing to truth-conditions, at other times doing something else. 
But even in cases where it is ostensibly most suitable, Sarc-analysis seems unable to explain how the 
relevant semantic inversion is determined. For example, consider (7) from Recanati (2000), where 
the speaker refers ironically to a salient individual, McPherson, who is being mocked for his 
philosophical pretensions: 
 This strategy has been applied to e.g. domain quantification (Stanley & Szabó 2000), indicative and subjunctive 20
conditionals (King & Stanley 2005), and metaphor (Stern 2000).
 We may think that the roles of  context at play here are the usual ones of  ordinary pre-semantics and meta-semantics—i.e. 21
contextual information bearing on what the relevant LF is (in resolving scope ambiguities), and on what fixes the relevant 
contraries. This is because a semanticist can allow roles for context to play in the calculation of  conventional meaning.
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(7)	 ‘Quine’ has not finished writing his paper.  
This example highlights the difficulty of  subsuming a local pragmatic inference to Sarc. There is no 
lexical inversion of  ‘Quine.’ The contrast is pragmatically created by mapping the name of  the 
great philosopher ‘Quine’ onto a referent in the common ground, McPherson, who has relevantly 
contrasting properties vis-à-vis philosophical ability.  As we’ll see later, Recanati argues that this 22
ironic use of  ‘Quine’ has a truth-conditional effect of  contributing the referent McPherson to what 
is said. However, Sarc cannot explain this contribution merely as semantic inversion.  
Furthermore, we might worry that the Sarc-account is too restrictive. As Camp (2012: 613) 
concedes, not only lexical irony embeds but also propositional irony. E.g. in (8), from Levinson 
(2000), the irony targets the entire proposition expressed by the antecedent; in (9) it involves not just 
the inversion of  the proposition expressed by the antecedent but a metaphoric interpretation of  it. 
(8)	 [Sun shining] If  it continues to rain like this, I’ll come to England more often. 
(9)	 If  God’s gift to philosophy comes, I’ll leave.  23
  
Before turning to a pragmatic strategy, another hypothesis the semanticist might adopt is a local 
context strategy that doesn’t posit a covert operator triggered by sarcastic intonation, and doesn’t 
require a semantic inversion. This allows a rich role for context and pragmatic factors to influence 
interpretation. E.g. in the case of  (7) the context is taken to map ‘Quine’ onto McPherson. The 
ironic interpretation comes in the explanation for why this interpretation shift happens—e.g. that 
typically context maps ‘Quine’ onto Quine, the great philosopher, but McPherson isn’t a great 
philosopher, so ‘Quine’ is mapped onto an individual with lesser philosophical ability. Further, in 
the case of  propositional irony, the local semanticist might argue that we can draw on contextual 
information. So that, in a local context, we can determine that the antecedent of  a conditional, as 
in (8)-(9), is mapped onto a different proposition than usual. The connection with irony comes in 
the explanation for the interpretation shift. This is insightful. Nevertheless, the ironic interpretation 
is restricted to propositional inverted-content, leaving out attitude expression. 
Finally, there is a more decisive argument against semanticism. Consider the conversation with 
two possible responses by Sam, to Tan’s sarcasm: 
(10)	 Tan:  Here’s George, the walking brain. 
Sam1: OK! It’s absurd to think George is a genius: he’s the very opposite of  one. But we 
shouldn’t be nasty about it. 
Sam2: OK! George is a real genius. But we shouldn’t be nasty about it.	   
Sam1 chides Tan for her sarcastic cruelty. He admits both that it’s ridiculous to believe George is a 
genius, and affirms the inverted-content. Sam2 does exactly the same, but it uses an ironic mode 
instead of  a literal utterance. Nevertheless, this makes Sam2’s utterance infelicitous, whereas Sam1’s 
 For simplicity, I ignore the possibility that ‘Quine’ is first interpreted metaphorically.22
 Thanks to Stephen Schiffer (p.c.) for the example.23
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utterance is felicitous. Why? After all, both utterances express similar commitments to a ridiculing 
attitude and inverted-content. The difference, I argue, lies not so much in the content conveyed, but 
in how that content is conveyed. Sam1 is literal; Sam2 is ironic. In using irony Sam2 is being a little 
nasty: he is doing the very thing he says we shouldn’t be doing. His utterance does not fit with his 
last comment about nastiness, and hence it’s infelicitous. 
This difference is precisely what makes a semantic explanation of  irony inadequate. First, as 
Camp sketched the view, Sarc ignores attitude altogether. But let’s suppose that by expanding her 
Sarc-operator idea, we can incorporate the attitude into the truth-conditions thus:  
 Sarc2: ‘Sarc(S)’ is true iff  (i) believing S is ridiculous/absurd, and (ii) [Invert-P] obtains. 
In this new rule, Sarc does at least model the attitude in (i), by treating it as propositional content 
that can contribute to what is asserted. However, this makes it hard to capture the difference 
between Sam1’s and Sam2’s utterances. On Sarc-analysis, Sam1’s utterance is identical in content to 
Sam2’s, so both ought to have a Sarc-reading. But this can’t explain the difference between expressing 
a ridiculing attitude, and merely stating it. Whereas Sam2 is undertaking actual performance of  an 
ironic-act with a view to drawing attention to how ridiculous it would be for one to earnestly 
consider or do the thing in question, Sam1 is merely asserting in a literal mode that a certain belief  
is ridiculous and affirming the inverted-content. Sam2 is ironic, but not Sam1. 
This explains why Sam2’s utterance is infelicitous: it is pragmatically defective because he is 
doing the very thing—ridiculing portrayal—he explicitly says we should not be doing. So, ridicule is 
required for irony. But Sam1 is not engaging in ridicule, so there is no semantic clash with the 
following commentary. Thus, the difference between Sam1 and Sam2 is not just a matter of  the 
content expressed, but how that content is expressed matters a great deal. 
We can conclude from this case that irony, pace Camp, cannot be merely stating that a certain 
belief  is absurd. Are there are other alternatives to make irony a component of  said-content?  
5	  Irony embeds as ‘strong’ pragmatic effect  
Let’s turn to a pragmatic strategy in the agenda of  truth-conditional pragmatics set out by Recanati 
(2004), among other pragmaticists. This involves using linguistically unconstrained pragmatic 
mechanisms such as a ‘free’ local pragmatic inference to tailor the meaning of  words or phrases, by 
contextually filling in, or filling out, information to the encoded content to enrich, or to loosen, the 
speaker’s message. The resulting pragmatically tailored meaning can thus feed compositionally into 
what is said.  24
Recanati (2000: ch. 17; 2007; 2010: ch. 8) has first applied this strategy to irony. He employs a 
mechanism of  context-shifting pretence—where the pretence amounts to shifting the actual context of  
utterance to a context of  a make-believe world. He distinguishes two kinds of  context-shifting 
 This strategy has been applied to metaphor, metonymy, approximation, hyperbole, among others. See Carston (2002), 24
Recanati (2004), Wilson & Sperber (2012), among others.
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where pretence can affect ‘locutionary’ acts such as a referring-act in (11a) (repeated from (7)), or 
‘illocutionary’ acts as (11b):  
(11)	 a. ‘Quine’ hasn’t finished writing his paper. 
	 b. [downpouring] What lovely weather! 
Let’s focus on (11a) because this is the case we saw the semantic strategy struggled with. The 
speaker pretends to refer to the great philosopher Quine, thereby partially shifting the actual 
context of  utterance—where ‘Quine’ picks up the philosopher Quine—to a pretend context or a 
make-believe world in which a salient individual, McPherson, is like the great philosopher Quine 
with respect to philosophical ability. As a result, the name ‘Quine’ picks up McPherson as a way of  
indicating his aspirations to be like the great philosopher Quine. 
Recanati explains this shift by appealing to pre-semantic pragmatic factors that affect what sorts 
of  pragmatic tailoring occurs. He draws on a pre-semantic distinction between character/content. He 
argues that ‘Quine’, instead of  being used with its normal semantic content, has its character shifted 
onto a metalinguistic character ‘the person named Quine.’ Thus, the semantic content of  ‘Quine’ is 
determined by whomever satisfies ‘the person named Quine’ in the pretend context, namely 
McPherson. As a result, McPherson enters into the truth-conditions, and not Quine. 
But clearly the speaker is doing something more than just asserting that McPherson hasn’t finished 
writing his paper. Her point is to ridicule those, who like McPherson himself, believe that he is 
anything like the great Quine. How is this attitude captured? One hypothesis is that in calling 
McPherson ‘Quine’, the speaker creates a contrast between the kind of  philosopher McPherson 
wants to be and the kind of  philosopher he is, thereby showing how his dreams and expectations 
fall short of  reality. This is a pragmatic contrast. It results from mapping relevant properties from 
general knowledge about Quine onto what is mutually known about McPherson. This requires a 
full-blown pragmatic reasoning to understand what the speaker is up to in contrasting McPherson 
and Quine. So this inference fits with implicature reasoning. But how can Recanati subsume this 
implicature-like inference to a pre-semantic mechanism of  context-shifting pretence?  
Recanati concedes that understanding the speaker’s point in shifting the reference from ‘Quine’ 
to McPherson requires grasping speaker’s intentions, in particular her intention to ridicule those 
who might think that McPherson is anything like Quine. But he denies that this inference is a 
Gricean-implicature. What is it then? One hypothesis, though Recanati doesn’t explore this in 
relation to irony, is to invoke a process of  so-called ‘outer pragmatics’ which he invokes in relation to 
quotation (Recanati 2013). This is a process very much like implicature, but whose output feeds 
compositionally into what is said.  
How does this help explain embedded irony? Imagine I’m trying to find a match for Sue, and 
you reply:  
(12)	  If  Sue goes out with one of  your fine friends, she will be miserable all night.  25
 Thanks to John Hawthorne (p.c.) for the example.25
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It follows from Recanati’s analysis of  irony that in uttering (12) the speaker pretends to refer to what 
the addressee calls their ‘fine friends’, thereby partially shifting the actual context of  utterance to a 
pretend context in which what they believe to be ‘fine friends’ are in fact lousy friends. In this shifted-
context, the antecedent is then mapped onto the proposition that Sue goes out with one of  the 
addressee’s lousy friends. How can Recanati explain this inversion from ‘fine friends’ to ‘lousy friends’? 
In (11a) we had a reference-shift, but here the shift concerns a general term. 
One hypothesis is that the context-shift induces a general term to refer to the opposite property 
by shifting the reference of  ‘fine’ to the property of  being lousy (just as the referent of  ‘Quine’ is 
shifted to McPherson). To explain this, Recanati might be invoking a shift in the circumstance of  
evaluation with respect to which the extension of  the description ‘fine friends’ is determined. The 
description is first interpreted with respect to the actual context, thus fixing the value of  the 
indexical ‘your’ to pick up the addressee. Then the description is evaluated with respect to the 
addressee’s belief-world in which what they call ‘fine friends’ picks out lousy friends. What friend is 
picked out will vary across the epistemically accessible worlds being quantified over. The upshot is 
that the inverted-content ‘lousy friends’ is fed into the truth-conditions of  the antecedent, thus 
affecting the truth-conditions of  the conditional. 
How about the attitude? Although Recanati doesn’t consider embedding of  irony, one 
hypothesis is that embedded irony is performed in a kind of  illocutionary act (including both 
attitude and inverted-content), but the force is cancelled somehow.  This is why in a conditional such 26
as (12) the speaker need not be committed to the conversational implicatures of  Irony (i)-(ii). How 
shall we understand this force cancellation?  
For Recanati, pretence or simulation is key to both performing an ironic act, and more generally 
to embedding in compounds. Irony involves a form of  displayed speech or thought, which 
Recanati (2004: 71) explains in terms of  implicature (i.e. his ‘secondary meaning’):  
What the speaker does in the ironical case is merely to pretend to assert the content of  her utterance. 
Still, there is an element of  indirectness here, and we can maintain that irony also possesses a secondary 
character. By pretending to assert something, the speaker conveys something else […] By pretending to 
say of  Paul that he is a fine friend in a situation in which just the opposite is obviously true, the speaker 
manages to communicate that Paul is everything but a fine friend. She shows, by her utterance, how 
inappropriate it would be to ascribe to Paul the property of  being a fine friend. 
Notably, for Recanati (2004: 77), pretence enters the content of  primary illocutionary acts. It 
introduces two layers of  acts. One consists in displaying an act F (with its content and force), while 
signalling it is feigned. We might call this bare pretence to F-ing. The other is ironic pretence which 
consists in staging the performance of  F with a view to showing that certain F-implications are 
ridiculous. This is the act that carries the ridiculing attitude. Recanati maintains that whereas the 
first act is merely displayed, the second one is actually performed so that the speaker counts as 
undertaking a ridiculing attitude, and further conveying an ironic inverted-content. 
How does this help with embedding? Recanati (2016) argues that embedded sentences involve a 
pretend assertion, or more generally pretend illocutionary acts. This requires that the cancellation 
induced by embedding is partial so that the part that is unaffected by the cancellation is not forceless 
 See Hanks (2007), among others.26
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(i.e. a non-committal act). Instead, the illocutionary act (or mental act in thought) that ties the 
propositional constituents into a unitary act is preserved under embedding. But it’s only maintained 
in the form of  an indicated illocutionary-act type that the sentence is used to perform in virtue of  the 
conventional forms for performing a given illocutionary act.  For example, in the case of  irony we 27
typically make an act of  assertion, but this is merely indicated and not actually performed. It is 
mimicked or displayed in the sense that the speaker is not subscribing to what she says, but she’s 
ascribing it to someone else whom she is ironically mocking.  
How to extend this thought to embedded irony? It follows from Recanati’s general analysis of  
embedding that what embeds in a conditional like (12) is an indicated ironic illocutionary-act type which 
is not actually performed, but merely displayed. An ironic illocutionary-act type is the kind of  act 
that is normally produced by a self-standing ironic utterance, thereby implicating a ridiculing 
attitude and an inverted-content, though crucially in an embedding context it lacks the ironic force.  
This idea involves giving up TC-Embedding, because it suggests that not only propositional (truth-
conditional) acts are performed by embedded sentences. The approach faces a serious question. 
How does a sentence, which normally encodes a proposition with a force, do something completely 
different when embedded—i.e. indicating an illocutionary-act type? It must be that some feature of  
the embedded sentence is responsible for this indicating. Since voice-stress is the canonical form for 
carrying ironic meaning, we might suppose that in the case of  a conditional like (12) it is voice-stress 
that carries the signal of  an ironic act-type in the antecedent. We can represent this thus: 
Ironic-Act Indication: ‘Sue goes out with one of  your fine friends’ + voice-stress indicates an  
	 	 	       ironic illocutionary-act type. 
  
This suggests that the voice-stress has different functions in self-standing acts and embedded cases. 
In self-standing acts, it is part of  a dramatic act. In embedded cases, it does something completely 
different—merely indicating an ironic illocutionary-act type. 
Finally, another possibility that aligns with Recanati’s general analysis of  embedding is to 
propose that the ironic sentences, when embedded, are performed in pretence acts. So, in uttering 
the antecedent of  the conditional in (12) the speaker is pretending to perform an ironic act. Given 
that irony itself  involves pretence, this amounts to a form of  pretence under pretence. So what embeds is 
the pretend ironic-act. But this just puts off  the problem. Now we have to contend with the idea of  
embedding a pretence act, which will present us with many of  the issues that the embedding of  
irony does anyway. What options are left available? 
6 	 Irony embeds qua implicature  
While one Gricean response was to deny embedding, and thus preserve TC-Embedding (see §3), 
another option would be to abandon TC-Embedding and thus free ourselves from the ban on 
 This may involve a mood-indicator which conventionally indicates the illocutionary potential of  a sentence (e.g. the assertion 27
sign to signal assertoric force, or the imperatival mood to signal commissive force).
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embedding implicatures. This opens up the possibility that what an embedded sentence contributes 
to the matrix of  the compound is a content that need not closely correspond to that of  the 
sentence’s literal meaning. Indeed, that content may be an implicature. This also opens up the 
possibility that logical operators can pick up on non-truth-conditional content such as implicature, 
not just truth-conditional content.  
In the remainder of  the paper I shall argue that irony can embed qua implicature, and consider 
the consequences. This means the ironic implicature of  a sentence-part can be used, in its quality 
of  implicature, in the computation of  the truth-conditions of  the whole compound.  
There are two worries with this proposal, though. One is the calculation problem.  This is the 28
problem of  showing how the implicature is worked out from a sentence-part, and not on the basis 
of  the speaker’s uttering a full complete utterance, as GRICE holds. For example, embedded 
sentences such as a conditional antecedent, or that-clause of  a belief-report, are not asserted on 
their own because they are part of  a larger compound. So according to GRICE, they cannot 
function as input for licensing implicatures. The other problem is the compositional problem. This 
concerns the truth-conditional compositionality which precludes implicatures from undergoing 
compositional processes. I argue that while the calculation problem may be solved by amending 
GRICE, the compositional problem is one that sticks. 
One solution to the calculation problem is to show that implicatures can be worked out locally, 
not only globally. There are two options to implement this. One is to argue that the input for 
implicature need not be a full-blown speech-act—i.e. it need not involve saying or asserting 
something with a commitment to the truth of  the proposition expressed. Instead, implicatures may 
also be carried by a weak notion of  ‘saying’—i.e. expressing a proposition with no commitment to 
its truth. Thus, one ‘says’ (though not asserts) something by the antecedent of  a conditional by 
virtue of  uttering the whole conditional and further implicates something else.  This weak notion of  29
saying aligns with Grice’s notion of  ‘making as if  to say’ to explain figurative speech—i.e. cases in 
which one play-says, openly pretending to say something, when one means something different. 
On this hypothesis then, in uttering a whole compound one utters the embedded sentence under 
a play-act in order to convey something ironical. Thus, play-saying something can function as input 
for a local implicature computed at the level of  the embedded sentence. This means that instead of  
reasoning about the speaker’s global intentions with the whole compound, the hearer may reason 
locally about the speaker’s point in uttering the embedded sentence under pretence, and how this is 
relevant to the whole compound. The upshot is that the hearer may now derive a local implicature 
sub-sententially, independent of  the whole compound. 
Other factors than pretence may play a key role in licensing local implicatures. For example, 
what is key for Mandy Simons (2010) in explaining embedded scalar implicatures, is the discourse 
status of  embedded sentences. The idea is that an embedded sentence such as the antecedent of  a 
conditional does not merely serve to contribute content to the proposition expressed by the whole 
conditional. Instead, the embedded sentences may fulfil a variety of  discursive functions to the 
 This problem has been taken up in relation to various embedded implicatures, see Recanati (2003), O’Rourke (2003), 28
Wearing (2013).
 Walker (1975: 151) uses this strategy to explain that embedded ‘and’-implicatures are still implicatures. 29
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extent that they are conceptually independent from the compound utterance of  which they are part.  30
This enables interpreters to pay attention to the embedded sentence as if  it’s a linguistic unit with a 
specific function within the discourse that is independent of  the containing compound. Thus, 
hearers can reason about why the speaker has produced that sentence-part, with that particular 
form, and how it contributes in turn to the relevance of  the whole compound. This gives rise to a 
local implicature by drawing on both local pragmatic considerations at the level of  the embedded 
sentence, and global pragmatic considerations involving finding a plausible interpretation of  the 
compound as a whole.  
Crucially, Simons insists that we should understand locality in two different ways. One is the idea 
that the implicature is computed locally—i.e. resulting from a process which takes into account only 
some sub-part of  the entire compound sentence. The other is that the implicature has local effects
—i.e. it becomes part of  the content of  the embedded sentence that falls under the scope of  logical 
operators. Nevertheless, Simons argues that inferences that are locally computed, such as 
embedded implicatures, may have a global effect in that they may be understood as a commitment 
undertaken by the speaker with the whole compound. 
This local-implicature account can be extended to embedded irony. On this account then, 
understanding embedded irony involves the interaction between local pragmatic considerations at 
the level of  the embedded sentence, and global pragmatic considerations such that we find a 
plausible interpretation of  the whole compound. This reasoning may go back and forth, between 
the embedded sentence and the whole compound of  which it is a part, until the ironic implicature 
is computed locally.  Thus, Simons’ idea can be extended to account for the calculation problem in 31
embedded irony. 
Another option to the calculation problem is to argue that the input for implicature is a full-
blown speech-act, as GRICE holds, but that the embedded sentence is performed under a local 
speech-act. Mackie (1973) and Stalnaker (1974) explore this option in relation to conditionals. 
Accordingly, making a conditional amounts to making two local speech-acts: supposing that P, then 
asserting Q within the scope of  that supposition. We can substantiate this by drawing insights from 
Stalnaker (2011). There he proposes replacing a truth-conditional analysis on which conditionals 
are asserting a conditional proposition, with a more congenial analysis where conditionals are seen as 
making a conditional assertion about two propositions: one expressed with the antecedent; the other 
with the consequent. Although conditional assertion is not a categorical (full-blown) assertion, 
Stalnaker (2011: 231) shows that it nevertheless performs a similar update on context: 
First, one adds the content of  the antecedent, temporarily, to the context; that is, one sets aside the 
possibilities in the context set in which the supposition is false. […] Then the content of  the consequent 
 This is evidenced by the fact that hearers can respond to the content of  the antecedent of  a conditional independently of  30
the whole conditional. Haegemann (2003) provides syntactic evidence for the independence between antecedent and 
consequent of  a conditional in terms of  illocutionary force in cases of  what she calls ‘premise-conditionals’.
 O’Rourke (2003) argues that Grice’s particularized implicatures associated with ‘and’ might be assigned quickly to 31
embedded sentences by virtue of  pre-packaged associations forged by its regular conjunction with the lexical term. Such 
implicatures became generalized and conventionalized with time, so the inference is short-circuited (Bach 1995). Extending 
this to embedded irony, we might argue that what started as ironic implicature may get conventionalized, and over time 
become a heuristic for detecting irony. This is helped by the idea that irony is conventionally associated with certain general 
speech pattern (e.g. intonation). Thus, ironic implicature can be assigned locally to the embedded sentence as the utterance 
unfolds. This is appealing, but irony is often creative, rather than conventionalized, so these cases are hard to accommodate 
with short-circuited inferences.
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is treated like the content of  a categorical assertion: one eliminates, from this temporary or derived 
context those possible situations that are incompatible with the content of  the consequent. 
On this hypothesis then, the Gricean might argue that in reasoning about what speech-act the 
speaker aims to achieve with the conditional, the hearer might have to locally infer the ironic 
implicature(s) carried by the antecedent, then add them temporarily to the context, and in this 
updated context evaluate the consequent. The upshot is that the overall speech-act the speaker is 
making in uttering a conditional is a conditional assertion, or for that matter any other speech-act 
made with the consequent that is conditional on the speech-act made with the antecedent. For 
example, in (2)—If  you come up with another brilliant idea like that, you’re fired—the speaker is threatening 
to fire the addressee, conditional on their producing another idiotic idea. The point can be 
generalized by showing how ironic implicatures carried by sentence-parts can be subsumed to the 
overall point made with other logical compounds (though different analyses might be needed 
depending on the logical operator under which irony embeds).  
On either of  these solutions, the ironic implicatures are generated locally and subsequently 
embedded under the embedded sentence. So the challenge from the calculation problem is thus 
met. Nevertheless, despite the appeal of  a local implicature account, the Gricean faces another 
pressing problem—the compositional problem. This is the problem of  explaining how the ironic 
implicature can undergo compositional processes, thereby affecting the truth-evaluation of  the 
whole compound. This violates TC-Embedding which precludes implicatures from entering 
compositional processes. One alternative at this point would be to abandon TC-Embedding, and thus 
release ourselves from the constraint of  composing only truth-conditional content. This also means 
that we have to allow logical operators to pick up on, and semantically process non-truth-
conditional content such as implicatures of  sentence-parts. To fully address this problem will 
require serious amendments, but this falls beyond the scope of  this paper.  
The Gricean might not be moved by this alternative suggestion. However, it’s worth noting that 
although the local implicature model has made strides towards explaining how implicatures embed, 
there remain some sticky issues that make embedded irony difficult compared to other embedded 
implicatures discussed so far in the literature. First, in contrast to other embedded implicatures 
where both what is said and what is implicated with the embedded sentence make a contribution to 
the whole compound, with embedded irony only the implicature is relevant, not what is said or 
made as if  said.  Nevertheless, what is (made as if) said with the embedded sentence is also present 32
for example in the antecedent of  a conditional like (2) on its ironic reading. It seems it better be, 
because it is this literal meaning of  the antecedent that is employed to infer irony.  
But here’s the problem. The truth-conditions associated with the literal content of  the 
antecedent in (2) are clearly not present as part of  what the speaker communicates with the 
antecedent. Similarly, for the belief-attribution in (3). If  that-clause encodes the literal proposition 
that George is a real genius, then why doesn’t the attribution in (3) assign this proposition as part of  
what Max believes? What is (made as if) said with the embedded sentence clashes with what is 
implicated by it, so what is (made as if) said is discarded. It seems we must conclude that on an 
ironic reading, the literal truth-conditions of  the embedded sentence are cancelled, and so are no 
 This problem arises also for self-standing irony (Wilson & Sperber 2002). The Gricean response has been to deploy the 32
concept of  ‘making as if  to say’.
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longer part of  the content it contributes to the whole compound. Though the literal content plays a 
role in how ironic attitude and inverted-content are gleaned, it’s not something the speaker 
communicates, so only the implicatures will be incorporated to the compound utterance. It is thus 
critical to allow ironic implicatures of  sentence-parts to undergo compositional processes such that 
they contribute to the truth-evaluation of  the whole compound.  
There is a final wrinkle on this localist approach. I said at the beginning (§2) that by embedding 
irony in a compound sentence there is no communication of  the implicatures Irony (i)-(ii) that 
attend self-standing ironic acts. The speaker isn’t undertaking such commitments as part of  her 
commitments with the whole compound. In uttering the embedded sentence, she is not 
undertaking actual performance of  an ironic-act, but merely uses irony as a means to achieve some 
further goals, say, making a conditional, reporting someone else’s beliefs, and so on and so forth. 
Thus, understanding what role irony plays in logical compounds requires understanding how 
characteristic ironic commitments are displayed in the service of  achieving other communicative 
goals. Clarifying the exact nature of  how speakers indicate or display characteristic commitments 
of  a speech-act type is an open problem. 
7  Conclusion 
I’ve argued that irony embeds in compound sentences such as conditionals and belief-reports. This 
raises a problem we need to take seriously. I’ve examined three strategies that are often considered 
in relation to the so-called embedded implicatures. The first two strategies attempt to preserve TC-
Embedding by explaining embedded irony as truth-conditional content. However, by trying to 
shoehorn irony into said-content, they raise problems of  their own. This leads us to prefer a local 
implicature model. I then showed how a modification of  the Gricean model that makes room for 
local implicature is in a better position to explain how irony embeds as an implicature. The 
consequence of  this is that we must abandon TC-Embedding.  
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by Research Project Grant no. F/00094/BE from 
the Leverhulme Trust, and Beatriu de Pinós Project Grant No. 2013 BP-B 00266 from AGAUR/
European Commission. Thanks to the anonymous reviewers for Inquiry, and especially to Stephen 
Barker, Alex Silk, John Barnden, Michael O’Rourke, Stephen Schiffer, John Hawthorne, François 
Recanati, Mitch Green, Guy Longworth, and Jeremy L Wyatt for helpful discussions. Many thanks 
for comments on previous drafts to Kent Bach, Brian Ball, Gunnar Björnsson, Liz Camp, Lenny 
Clapp, Stephen Finlay, Francesco Gentile, Ray Gibbs, Alison Hall, Bjørn Jespersen, Stephen 
Laurence, Jeanette Littlemore, Agnieszka Piskorska, Paul Saka, Adam Sennet, Aaron Sloman, 
David Spewak, Zoltan Szabó, Thorstein Fretheim, Bob van Tiel, Elmar Geir Unnsteinsson, 
Alastair Wilson, and Deirdre Wilson. 
References 
Bach, K. (1994). Conversational impliciture. Mind & Language, 9 , l24-62. 
Bach, K. (1995a). Standardization vs. Conventionalization. Linguistics and Philosophy , 18: 677-686. 
Bach, K. (1995b). Standardization vs. Conventionalization. Linguistics and Philosophy, 18, 677-686. 
!20
EMBEDDING IRONY
Bach, K. (2005). Regressions in Pragmatics (and Semantics). (In N. Burton-Roberts (Eds.), Advances in  
Pragmatics  (pp. 24-44). Palgrave-Macmillian.) 
Barker, S. J., (2003). Truth and conventional implicature. Mind, 112 (445), 1-33. 
Barker, S. J., (2017). Figurative speech: pointing a poisoned arrow at the heart of  semantics. Philosophical  
Studies 174(1): 123–140. 
Barker, S. L., & Popa-Wyatt, M. (2015). Irony and the dogma of  sense and force. Analysis, 75, 9–16. 
Bezuidenhout, A. (2001). Metaphor and What is Said: A Defense of  a Direct ExpressionView of  Metaphor,  
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 25, 156–186. 
Bezuidenhout, A. (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Philosophical Perspectives, 16, 105-134. 
Bezuidenhout, A. (2015). The Implicit Dimension of  Meaning: Ways of  “Filling In” and “Filling Out”  
Content. Erkenntnis 80, 89–109. 
Borg, E. (2004). Minimal Semantics. (Oxford University Press). 
Breheny, R., Katsos, N. & Williams (2005). Are Generalized Scalar Implicatures Generated Default? An On- 
Line Investigation into the Role of  Context in Generating Pragmatic Inferences. Cognition, XX 1- 
Camp, E. (2012). Sarcasm, pretence, and the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Noûs, 46, 587-634. 
Carston, R. (1991). Implicature, explicature, and truth-theoretic semantics. In S. Davis (Eds.), Pragmatics:  
A reader (pp. 33–51). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Carston, R. (1998). Informativeness, Relevance and Scalar Implicature. (In R. Carston & S. Uchida (Eds.)  
Relevance Theory: Applications and Implications (pp. 179-236). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.) 
Carston, R. (2002). Thoughts and Utterances. (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Carston, R. (2004). Truth-conditional content and conversational implicature. In C. Bianchi (Eds.), The  
semantics/pragmatics distinction (pp. 65–100). Stanford: CSLI Publications. 
Cohen, J. (1971). Some Remarks on Grice’s Views About the Logical Particles of  Natural Language. (In Y.  
Bar-Hillel (Eds.), Pragmatics of  Natural Languages (pp. 50-68). Dordrecht: Reidel.) 
Chierchia, G. & Fox D., Spector B., (2012). The Grammatical View of  Scalar Implicatures and the  
Relationship between Semantics and Pragmatics.  In P. Portner, C. Maienborn, & K. von Heusinger 
(Eds.), An international handbook of  natural language meaning, 2297-2332. Berlin: Mouton de 
Gruyter. 
Currie, G. (2006). Why irony is pretence. (In Nichols S. (Eds.), The Architecture of  the Imagination (pp. 111-133).  
Oxford University Press). 
García-Carpintero M. (2001). Gricean Rational Reconstruction and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.  
Synthese, 97, 93-131. 
Gauker, C. (2001). Situated Inference versus Conversational Implicatures, Noûs 35:2, 163–189. 
Geurts, B. (2009). Scalar implicature and local pragmatics. Mind & Language, 24(1), 51-79. 
Green, M. (1998). Direct Reference and Implicature. Philosophical Studies, 91, 61-90. 
Grice, P. H. (1989). Studies in the Way of  Words. (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press). 
Haegaeman, L. (2003). Conditional Clauses: External and Internal Syntax. Mind & Language  18/4, 
317–339. 
Hanks, P. (2007). The content-force distinction. Philosophical Studies, 134, 141–164. 
King, J. C. & Stanley J. (2005). Semantics, Pragmatics, and The Role of  Semantic Content (In Z. Szabó  
(Eds.), Semantics vs. Pragmatics. (pp. 133-181). Oxford University Press). 
Lepore, E. & Stone, M. 2014. Imagination & Convention. Oxford University Press.  
Mackie, J. (1973). Truth, Probability and Paradox. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Neale, S. 2005. Pragmatism and binding. In Semantics versus Pragmatics, Z. G. Szabo (Eds.), pp. 165-285.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Noveck, I. & Sperber, D. (2007). The Why and How of  Experimental Pragmatics: The Case of  ‘Scalar  
Inferences.’ (In N. Burton-Roberts (Eds.), Advances in Pragmatics. (pp. 184-212). Palgrave-Macmillian.) 
O’Rourke, M. (2003). The Scope Argument. Journal of  Philosophy, 100(3), 136-157. 
Popa, M. (2009). Figuring the Code: Pragmatic Routes to Non-literal. University of  Geneva. 
Popa, M. (2010a). Ironic metaphor interpretation. Toronto Working Papers in Linguistics, 33, 1–17. 
Popa, M. (2010b). Ironic metaphor: a case for Metaphor’s Contribution to Truth-conditions. In E.  
Walaszewska, M Kisielewska-Krysiuk & A. Piskorska (ed.) In the Mind and Across Minds: A Relevance- 
theoretic Perspective on Communication and Translation, pp. 224-245, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
Popa-Wyatt, M. (2014). Pretence and echo: towards an integrated account of  verbal irony. International Review  
of  Pragmatics 6: 127–68. 
Popa-Wyatt, M. (2017). Compound figures: priority and speech-act structure. Philosophical Studies 174(1): 
141-161. 
Pietroski, P. forth. Conjoining Meanings: Semantics without Truth Values. Oxford University Press. 
!21
EMBEDDING IRONY
Recanati, F. (1989). The pragmatics of  what is said. Mind and Language, 4, 295–329. 
Recanati, F. (2000). Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta. (The MIT Press). 
Recanati, F. (2003). Embedded implicatures. Philosophical Perspectives, 17(1), 87-115. 
Recanati, F. (2004). Literal Meaning. (Cambridge University Press). 
Recanati, F. (2013). Reply to De Brabanter. Teorema vol. XXXII/2,149-156. 
Recanati, F. (2016). Force Cancellation. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1223-9 
Rooij, R. van & Schultz, K. (2004). Exhaustive Interpretation of  Complex Sentences. Journal of  Logic, Language  
and Information, 13, 491-519. 
Russell, B. (2006). Against grammatical computation of  Scalar Implicatures. Journal of  Semantics, 23(4),  
361-382. 
Sauerland, U. (2004). Scalar Implicatures in Complex Sentences. Linguistics and Philosophy 27, 367–391. 
Simons, M. (2010). A Gricean view on intrusive implicatures. (In K. Petrus (Eds.), Meaning and Analysis: New  
Essays on H. Paul Grice (pp. 138-169). Palgrave.) 
Stalnaker, R. (1974). Pragmatic Presuppositions. (In M. Munitz and P. Unger (Eds.) Semantics and Philosophy  
(pp. 197-214). New York: New York University Press). 
Stalnaker, R. (2011). Conditional propositions and conditional assertions (In A. Egan & B. Weatherson  
(Eds.)), Epistemic Modality. (pp. 227-248) Oxford University Press). 
Stanley, J. & Szabó, Z. (2000). On Quantifier Domain Restriction. Mind & Language 15 (2&3), 219-261. 
Stanley, J. (2000): Context and Logical Form. Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 391–434. 
Stern J. (2000). Metaphor in Context. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
Travis, C. (2000). Unshadowed Thoughts. Harvard University Press. 
Walker, R. (1975). Conversational Implicature. (In S. Blackburn (Eds.), Meaning, Reference and Necessity (pp.  
133-81). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Wearing, C. (2013). Metaphor and the scope argument. (In C. Penco & F. Domaneschi (Eds.). What is said and  
what is not said (pp. 141-157). CSLI Publications. 
Wilson, D. (1975). Presupposition and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics. (London: Academic Press). 
Wilson, D. (2006). The pragmatics of  verbal irony: echo or pretence? Lingua, 116, 1722-1743. 
Wilson, D. & Sperber, D. (2002). Truthfulness and relevance. Mind, 11 (443), 583-682. 
Wilson, D & D. Sperber (2012). Meaning and Relevance. Cambridge University Press. 
!22
